Islamists Accuse Blackwater/Xe in Deadly Bombing of a Shabaab Controlled Mosque

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Andrew McGregor

May 13, 2010

At least 45 people were killed and over 80 wounded in a May 1 bombing of the Abdallah Shideye Mosque in Mogadishu’s Bakara market. The mosque and the market are currently controlled by the radical al-Shabaab Islamist movement. The next day a hand grenade was thrown into a Shabaab-controlled mosque in the southern port of Kismayo. One person was killed and seven injured, though the blast missed senior al-Shabaab officials who were still on their way to the mosque (Shabelle Media Network, May 2). Days earlier, a landmine was set off just outside the Shabaab-controlled Abu Hureyra mosque in the Bakara market, killing one and injuring eight (Garowe Online, May 1).

shangoleShaykh Fu’ad Muhammad Qalaf “Shangole”

Two to three explosions occurred simultaneously within the Abdallah Shideye mosque as some 800 worshippers were gathering for noon prayers. Among those injured was a senior al-Shabaab official (and the possible target of the bombing), Shaykh Fu’ad Muhammad Qalaf “Shangole,” who described the incident:

While we were in the middle of our lesson and it was near prayer time, three explosions happened, one after the other went off, and I saw the chair I was sitting on fly across the mosque. I saw my white thawb [an ankle-length cotton garment] was red with blood and I couldn’t tell where the blood was coming from. When I opened my eyes, I saw that many people were in pain and that many others had been martyred (al-Qimmah, May 8).

Al-Shabaab spokesman Shaykh Ali Mahmud Raage (a.k.a. Shaykh Ali Dheere) insisted “foreign mercenaries” were responsible for the attack (Radio Gaalkacyo, May 2). Shaykh Ali Muhammad Husayn, the Shabaab governor of Banadir region (which includes Mogadishu), accused the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of carrying out the bombings, vowing immediate revenge (Voice of Mudug Radio, May 2). The shaykh also said the movement would improve security in mosques and other public places, describing the bombing as “an unforgettable lesson” (Shabelle Media Network, May 2).

Eventually al-Shabaab leaders agreed the explosions were the work of American mercenaries working for private military contractors Blackwater (now Xe Services LLC). According to Shaykh Fu’ad Muhammad Qalaf, Blackwater personnel had arrived in Somalia two weeks earlier and were involved in training “apostate” forces at the Halane military base near Mogadishu airport, currently used by African Union peacekeepers fighting on the side of the TFG (al-Qimmah, May 1; May 8; Garowe Online, May 4). Al-Shabaab leaders alleged that Blackwater operatives had been responsible for similar mosque bombings in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Shaykh Ali Mahmud Raage warned of the arrival of “Blackwater mercenaries” last January. “We have discovered that U.S. agencies are going to launch suicide bombings in public places in Mogadishu. They have tried it in Algeria, Pakistan and Afghanistan… They want to target Bakara Market and mosques, then use that to malign us.” The shaykh told tribal elders that Blackwater/Xe was recruiting locals to help carry out a bombing campaign (Dayniile, January 11; Press TV, January 12). In March, the shaykh claimed private U.S. contractors such as Blackwater/Xe were responsible for a wave of assassinations of Shabaab leaders (al-Jazeera, March 10)  The Shabaab spokesman was quick to remind reporters of his earlier warning after the attack on the Abdallah Shideye Mosque (Garowe Online, May 1).

The introduction of mosque bombings to the Somali conflict has shocked many Somalis, who almost reflexively look beyond their own culture for an explanation of this phenomenon, much as they did with the earlier introduction of suicide bombings by al-Shabaab.  A TFG spokesman described the mosque attacks as a “new foreign barbaric phenomena”; leaders of both al-Shabaab’s rival Hizb al-Islam militia and the pro-government Ahlu Sunnah wa’l-Jama’a (ASJ) militia alleged a foreign origin for the attacks (Garowe Online, May 3). With no claim of responsibility, there is still a wide range of suspects, including the Sufi ASJ, which has suffered from al-Shabaab’s continuing destruction of Sufi shrines and the tombs of revered Sufi shaykhs (see Terrorism Monitor, April 1).

Xe owner Erik Prince urged the U.S. government last January to deploy private military contractors to fight “terrorists” in Somalia, Yemen, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia (The Nation, May 3; Times Online, May 5). Rumors of Blackwater/Xe’s presence and activities are already common currency in Pakistan and now appear to be sweeping Somalia as culprits are sought in a vicious new stage of the continuing transformation of Somalia’s civil war from clan-based warfare to sectarian struggle.

This article first appeared in the May 13, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

“The Way of War Is Not Paved With Flowers” – Sirajuddin Haqqani on the War in Afghanistan

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Andrew McGregor

May 13, 2010

Thirty-year-old Sirajuddin Haqqani controls a powerful insurgent group known as the Haqqani Network along Afghanistan’s southeastern border with the Tribal Areas of north-west Pakistan, particularly in the provinces of Khost, Paktika and Paktia (Al-Balagh Media Center, April 13).  Operating with apparent autonomy under the broader structure of the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” (the Taliban-dominated political structure of the Islamic resistance), Sirajuddin’s network has earned a reputation for deadly efficiency in its attacks on local and international forces in the region.

Sirajuddin HaqqaniSirajuddin Haqqani

Sirajuddin recently answered questions from forum members on a jihadi website, part of an effort to create a public profile for the once reclusive mujahid (ansar1.info; see also Terrorism Monitor, January 28).

On the impact of attacks by CIA-directed unmanned aerial vehicles, Sirajuddin did not hesitate to acknowledge their effectiveness, but warned setbacks are part of the longer struggle:

While you sometimes hear some news on the martyrdom of some mujahideen by an unmanned aerial vehicle, you should also know that the mujahideen do weaken their enemies and make them suffer heavy casualties and financial losses. In addition, you should know that the way of war is not paved with flowers. Hardships and sacrifices are what bring victory.

With regard to the devastating Khost suicide bombing that targeted CIA personnel last December, Sirajuddin claimed this operation had helped reduce the CIA’s operational accuracy by 60%. He noted elite personnel and the “smartest CIA officers” had been killed, while spies (such as Khost bomber Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi) became mistrusted, leading to a disruption of CIA intelligence gathering and delays in the process of recruiting new spies.

When asked about February’s joint NATO/Afghan Operation Moshtarak in the Marjah region of Helmand province, Sirajuddin described it as nothing more than “a media stunt… The enemies were defeated in Marjah. They achieved nothing.”

The mujahideen commander sees the hand of Israel behind Coalition activities in Afghanistan:

The Crusaders’ assaults against Afghanistan aim primarily to establish Greater Israel. The current Crusade plan, which is designed by Greater Israel, aims to remove the obstacles that hinder the establishment of Greater Israel. We believe that defeating the United States in Afghanistan will help to hinder this Crusade against the Muslim world. In addition, we believe that their defeat will pave our way for liberating Jerusalem..

Elsewhere, the mujahideen commander claimed the United States and its agents were encouraging the production of opium, while the mujahideen had no connection with the crop and did not use it for financial support. Sirajuddin also denied reports the Taliban were burning girls’ schools, claiming, “This is a blatant lie. It is a weird game played by the Crusaders. They build schools for girls to win over the public and then burn them to harm the reputation of the mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” He added that peace talks would be impossible so long as the occupation continued.

This article first appeared in the May 13, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Japan Opens Naval Base in Djibouti in Defiance of Peace Constitution

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Andrew McGregor

May 6, 2010

Japanese authorities have confirmed their intention to develop a Japanese naval base in the Horn of Africa nation of Djibouti, already home to large American and French military installations. The base will be Japan’s first overseas since Japan’s defeat in 1945 and the major political and military reforms that followed. The $40 million base is expected to be ready early in 2011 and will provide a permanent port for ships of Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF).

Japan DjiboutiThe plans for a Japanese base in Djibouti were first announced last July, when Tokyo outlined its intention to build housing facilities and an airstrip for JMSDF Lockheed P-3C Orion surveillance aircraft. The decision followed a request by U.S. authorities for Japan to build facilities that would allow it to take a larger role in security operations in the Gulf of Aden (Kyodo News, July 31, 2009).

Japanese navy commander Keizo Kitagawa of the JMSDF’s Plans and Policy section told reporters “We are deploying here to fight piracy and for our self-defense. Japan is a maritime nation and the increase in piracy in the Gulf of Aden through which 20,000 vessels sail every year is worrying” (AFP, April 23). According to Japanese authorities, 99% of Japanese exports rely on use of the shipping lanes off Somalia (Somaliland Press, April 29; Alshahid, April 29).

Japan sent teams of military experts to Yemen, Oman, Kenya and Djibouti to explore the possibilities of opening a naval base in one of these nations. Djibouti was chosen in April, 2009. Japanese personnel and material supporting the JMSDF deployment off Somalia are currently housed in rented space at the American base at Djibouti’s Camp Lemonnier, a former French Foreign Legion base. French troops in Djibouti are engaged in anti-piracy operations, training French troops for action in Afghanistan and keeping an eye on the volatile Horn of Africa region (Radio France Internationale, April 18).

Japan Djibouti 2Japan’s Special Boarding Unit: Active in the Horn of Africa

The largest warships in the JMSDF are Guided Missile Destroyers, Destroyers and Helicopter Destroyers. Japan has been deploying a pair of destroyers on a rotational basis in the Gulf of Aden since last year. The naval deployment includes members of the Special Boarding Unit (SBU), a Hiroshima-based Special Forces unit patterned after the U.K.’s Special Boat Service (SBS).

The creation of a Japanese military base in Africa would have been implausible only a few years ago, as such deployments are in clear violation of Japan’s 1947 “Peace Constitution,” which forbids the maintenance of a Japanese military, the deployment of Japanese military forces overseas and participation in collective military operations, regardless of their purpose. With American encouragement during the Cold War, Japan began a conscious evasion of the Peace Constitution by creating “Self-Defense” Forces rather than a Japanese military. Japanese troops began overseas deployments in the early 1990s with non-combatant peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and Mozambique. After 9/11, new anti-terrorism and anti-piracy laws eased the transition to offshore operations. The JMSDF provided support to American forces in Afghanistan from 2001 to January 2010 and Japanese Ground Forces joined Coalition operations in Iraq in a humanitarian capacity in 2004. Technically, all members of Japan’s Self Defense Forces are classified as civilian civil servants and the naval deployment to the Horn of Africa is being characterized by the government as anti-crime operations rather than military operations.

This article first appeared in the May 6, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

 

Chadian Opposition Clashes with Government Troops

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Andrew McGregor

May 6, 2010

Reports have emerged of a pair of battles on April 24 and April 28 between Chadian government forces and those of the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance Nationale (FPRN), one of a number of rebel movements seeking to overthrow the government of President Idriss Déby. The fighting apparently took place close to the village of For Djahaname, near the border with Sudan’s Darfur province. Fighting took place in December 2009 in the same region, which is home to the cross-border Salamat Arab tribe (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 1).

Chad Opp 1Chadian Government Forces Take the Offensive

Government spokesmen claimed the army had killed 105 insurgents and captured another 80 in the two clashes. FPRN forces led by Adam Yacoub Kougou claimed to have defeated the government’s troops on April 24, capturing a large quantity of weapons, but after the second battle it said only that large numbers of troops had been lost on both sides and that it was awaiting expected air raids by Chadian warplanes (AFP, April 24). The FPRN leadership later claimed the regime had been “caught lying red-handed,” and that 64 wounded soldiers had been taken to French military facilities in Chad for medical treatment (AFP, May 1).

Unlike most of the Chadian opposition groups, which are based across the border in Darfur, the FPRN is based inside Chad. The usual pattern for such attacks is for N’Djamena to claim that those responsible were working for the Sudanese government, followed by retaliatory attacks by Chad’s own proxies in Darfur. When the initial attack occurs in Sudan, the entire process is reversed. This time, however, N’Djamena did not blame Khartoum, keeping instead to the reconciliatory path the two nations have been following since January. Rather than recriminations, N’Djamena actually congratulated Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on his “brilliant” victory in the recent Sudanese elections (Reuters, April 29). President Déby also did Khartoum a favor by denouncing the Southern Sudanese separatist movement, saying independence would harm both Sudan and the region at large. The Chad-Sudan border was reopened in mid-April for the first time in seven years (AFP, April 14).

Chad Opp 2FPRN Leader Adam Yacoub Kougou 

The N’Djamena regime began negotiations with several opposition groups in April as part of the larger reconciliation program, but the FPRN was not involved in these talks (AFP, April 26). The movement consists mainly of rebels who left the umbrella UFR group because they opposed negotiations with the Déby regime. Another rebel movement, the Mouvement pour la democratie et la justice au Tchad (MDJT), signed a ceasefire with the government on April 24 (PANA Online, April 24). MDJT fighters are scheduled to be integrated into Chad’s military and security forces. Déby is said to be exhausted with never-ending negotiations with Chad’s rebel movements, and has told the remaining rebels that he has “no money, no positions, or anything else to give” (L’Observateur [N’Djamena], April 14).

Unfortunately for Déby, the clashes came just as his government was attempting to persuade Europe and the United Nations that peacekeepers are no longer needed in eastern Chad, the site of the battles. N’Djamena has insisted on the departure of the U.N.’s Mission des Nations Unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad (MINURCAT), a 5,000-man peacekeeping mission deployed in the Central African Republic and the eastern regions of Chad, the frontline of the conflict between Déby’s regime and the insurgents. Without cooperation from N’Djamena, MINURCAT’s Irish and Finnish contingents have decided to withdraw, while the mission as a whole will be drastically scaled back as heavy weapons and equipment are withdrawn from Chad. After May 16, the mission will consist of only 1,900 men, far short of the figure necessary to be effective. Déby has called the mission “a failure,” suggesting the peacekeepers were unwilling to leave the safety of their fortified bases (AFP, April 23).

Across the border in Darfur, it appears that the peace accord between Khartoum and the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is beginning to unravel. JEM, which appears to have lost some degree of its former support from N’Djamena, has reported various low level clashes with government forces in recent days. JEM forces in West Darfur claim Sudanese MiGs and Antonov aircraft are flying reconnaissance flights over JEM deployments in West Darfur in preparation for a major government offensive using heavy weapons and local auxiliaries (Sudan Tribune, April 22).

This article first appeared in the May 6, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

 

Shaykh Abu Al-Harith Describes Salafist Opposition to Hamas and Israel

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Andrew McGregor

April 29, 2010

As Hamas struggles with the transition from militant group to government in Gaza, the movement has lost much of the initiative in its confrontation with Israel to a number of Salafi-Jihadi groups that promise uncompromising resistance to Hamas and Israel alike. In a recent interview with a Palestinian news agency, Shaykh Abu al-Harith, a commander of Jund Ansar Allah (Army of the Supporters of God) described the current state of the Salafist opposition, which he claims now has 11,000 active supporters distributed between four main groups: Jund al-Islam, Tawhid wa’l-Jihad, Jund Ansar Allah and Jund Allah (Ma’an News Agency, April 18).

Jund Ansar AllahJund Ansar Allah Fighters

Abu al-Harith insists none of the Salafist groups in Gaza have real ties with al-Qaeda, but all are highly influenced by al-Qaeda ideology, the success of the 9/11 attacks and various high-profile suicide operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Shaykh described the main ideological influences of the Salafi-Jihadi groups in Gaza, citing the works of Shaykh Ibn Taymiyah (1263-1328) and Shaykh Ibn al-Qayyim (1292-1350), both of whom provided the foundation for the takfiri approach adopted by most Salafist radicals. In the modern era, al-Harith cites Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the Jordanian ideologue of jihad who was once a spiritual mentor to the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. In keeping with the basis of the takfiri philosophy, al-Harith describes the individuals in the Fatah leadership in the West Bank as “apostates.”

Though Gaza Salafist groups began carrying out limited operations in 2001, it was Hamas’s decision to enter the political process in 2006 that sparked a sudden growth in recruitment and development of the armed Salafist movements in Gaza. Nevertheless, al-Harith admits that the Salafist groups are not nearly as strong as Hamas and have suffered greatly in confrontations with that movement, such as the Hamas assault on the Ibn Taymiyah mosque in August 2009 that resulted in the death of Jund Ansar Allah leader Abdel-Latif Moussa after he prematurely declared an Islamic Emirate in Gaza (Ma’an, August 16, 2009).  Security services in Gaza continue to track and arrest Salafist operatives. “We are under round-the-clock surveillance. Our activities are fraught with risks.”

Where Hamas had once inspired its young followers with a commitment to jihad and resistance against Israel, its attempt to form a government did not resonate with many young fighters, who suddenly became available to the Salafist groups. Al-Harith notes that many of these had already obtained military training from the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (the armed wing of Hamas), al-Nasir Salah al-Din Brigades and the Harakat al-Jihad al-Islam fi Filastin (Palestinian Islamic Jihad). Recruitment is done carefully, with extensive background checks followed by thorough training in Islam, security techniques and military tactics.

Perhaps because of the pressure put on the Salafist movements by Hamas, the Jund Ansar Allah spokesman appears to have moderated his earlier views on Hamas (as expressed in 2008). “The Muslim Brotherhood [i.e. Hamas] does not appreciate the approach of the pious ancestors [the Salaf], which means it should be eradicated” (Hanein.info, September 17, 2008). Al-Harith now insists the Salafist movements are not trying to destroy Hamas, but are instead seeking a religious dialogue with Hamas that would bring about the full implementation of Shari’a in Gaza. “We are not interested in opening an internal front against anyone. Our aim is to kill the Jews and apply the Shari’a.”

A Counterterrorism Naval Force for Bangladesh

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Andrew McGregor

April 29, 2010

After years of relative neglect, Bangladesh is initiating a major overhaul of its maritime security apparatus, designed not only to improve its coastal defenses against terrorists and organized crime, but also to create a navy capable of serving in international peacekeeping operations, an important source of foreign currency for the largely impoverished nation.

BNS OsmanBNS Osman

Following a request from the Dhaka government, the United States has supplied 15 Defender Class patrol boats to the Bangladeshi Navy and Coast Guard to help secure the nation’s extensive maritime borders. The 16 boats will come under the command of the Navy Special Operations Force, with a further six designated for use by the Bangladesh Coast Guard (Daily Star [Dhaka], April 13; Bangladesh News 24 Hours, April 13). According to the U.S. embassy, “This donation is the largest delivery of U.S. Coast Guard boats to any nation” (New Nation [Dhaka], April 14). U.S. forces will provide training in use of the new ships as part of the joint “Tiger Shark” exercise in late May. U.S. military units will concentrate on training elements of the Army, Navy and Coast Guard in counterterrorism operations, anti-piracy operations and general maritime security.

Manufactured by Safe Boats International in Washington State, the 25 foot (8 meter) boats are typically used in the United States for search and rescue, port security and law enforcement activities. Defender class boats can be armed with heavy machine guns and are capable of a speed of 46 knots.

Since its formation in 1971, the Bangladesh navy has focused on local waters, but took a major step towards international operations earlier this month by sending two warships, BNS Osman and BNS Madhumati, to join the maritime taskforce of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (Daily Star, April 12). BNS Osman (the former PLAN Xiangtan) is a Chinese-built Jianghu class guided missile frigate that was involved in a 1988 naval skirmish with Vietnamese naval forces in the Spratley Islands. The smaller Madhumati is a Korean-built offshore patrol vessel, built by Hyundai and launched in 1997.

Unlike the navy, the Bangladesh army is well traveled, being one of the most prolific contributors to U.N. peacekeeping forces. Since 1988, the army has participated in 30 peacekeeping operations in 25 different countries. These operations are a major source of foreign currency for the government in Dhaka.

Only a day before the departure of the Osman and the Madhumati, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced the government’s plan to transform the Bangladesh navy into a “three-dimensional force” through the addition of submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters and two new Chinese-built frigates. The Korean-built Ulsan class frigate BNS Bangabandhu (formerly known as BNS Khalid Bin Walid), currently decommissioned despite being the navy’s most advanced warship, will also be brought out of reserve (Daily Star, April 11).

The Bangladesh military is eager to erase some of the indignities suffered through a large-scale mutiny in the Bangladeshi Rifles (BDR) in February, 2009, in which 74 people were killed in a remarkably brutal fashion, including 57 officers and BDR chief Major General Shakil Ahmed (Times of India, April 7).

Algeria Launches Nation-Wide Counter-Terrorism Offensive

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Andrew McGregor

April 22, 2010

With al-Qaeda activities in the Sahel/Sahara region of Africa creating havoc with commerce, trade, resource extraction, tourism and general security, the nations of the region appear ready to mount a coordinated military approach to the elimination of Salafist militants. Algeria, with the largest and best-armed of the militaries in the region, launched a sweeping counter-terrorism offensive last week, entitled Operation Ennasr (“Victory”).

Algeria 1Major General Ahmad Gaid Salah

Algeria’s Armée Nationale Populaire (ANP) is under orders from the army’s chief-of-staff, Major-General Ahmad Gaid Salah, to “clean out the terrorist maquis” (Liberté [Algiers], April 13). The operation is targeting bases of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the western, central and eastern parts of Algeria. Unlike operations in the desert regions of south Algeria, Operation Ennasr is focusing on the mountainous and heavily wooded regions where AQIM has its hideouts. Ground and helicopter-borne elements of the ANP are being supported by local police and units of the Gendarmerie Nationale (al-Dark al-Watani), Algeria’s rural police force. The elimination of AQIM elements in Algeria is complicated by the movement’s policy of operating in cells of 4-5 fighters, thus reducing the risk posed to the organization’s survival by any one encounter with security forces (El Watan [Algiers], April 14).

It was reported that a ground operation supported by helicopters in the forests of Bordj Bou Arreridj province had eliminated 12 terrorists and captured a number of others. Algerian authorities are using DNA evidence to identify the dead militants (El-Khabar [Algiers], April 14; L’Expression [Algiers], April 15).

Lack of surveillance aircraft, heavy transport, jet-fighters and even helicopters in many of the Sahel/Sahara nations inhibits counterterrorist efforts conducted over a vast and often inhospitable region. In this regard, Algeria, one of the few area nations with a large and capable air force, has been urging Nigeria to add its air force to the campaign against AQIM. Algiers has informed Abuja that AQIM Amirs have begun recruiting in north Nigeria (Jeune Afrique, April 17).  Both Nigeria and Senegal, another proposed member of the alliance, are expected to attend the next meeting of regional security officials (El-Khabar [Algiers], April 7).

After irritating Algerian leaders by including that nation on the American terrorist blacklist following the failed Christmas Day attack aboard an American airliner by a Nigerian would-be bomber, Washington has been making major efforts of late to reassure Algeria it is a vital and trusted part of America’s counterterrorism strategy. A recent visit by FBI officials was followed on April 7 by a visit from U.S. Attorney-General Eric Holder to sign a security agreement covering counterterrorism, organized crime, drug enforcement and judicial cooperation (Algerian Radio, April 7).

Developing Regional Counterterrorist Strategies

It was announced on April 20 that a military summit in the southern Algerian oasis town of Tamanrasset had agreed to form a “Joint Operational Military Committee” with headquarters in that town to deal with the problem of AQIM and gangs of drug traffickers who make use of poorly defined or guarded borders. While it was known that Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania were considering such a move, the announcement contained the surprising news that Libya, Chad and Burkina Faso had also joined the initiative.  The new joint command, to begin work by the end of April, will include officers from each of the participating Sahara/Sahel nations. Morocco, a rival to Algeria for influence in the region, appears to have been deliberately left out of the new formation. Many details of the initiative have yet to be revealed, including the command’s financing, the composition of joint military forces (if any) and whether joint forces would be permitted to cross borders in pursuit of terrorists (Afrol News, April 20).

The summit of military commanders followed hard on earlier meetings between the foreign ministers and the intelligence chiefs of the seven Sahara/Sahel nations that began on March 16. A summit of regional heads-of-state is expected to follow. Algeria has played the leading role in developing military cooperation in the region; the Algerian Ministry of Defense described the meetings as a means of defining “the ways and means capable of putting in place a collective and co-responsible strategy for fighting against terrorism and transnational crime.”

One motivation behind the rather rapid development of diplomatic and military cooperation in the region appears to be the desire of participating nations to avoid foreign [i.e. American] intervention in the region to deal with AQIM. One of those present at the military summit told a Malian daily that “There was a call on Algiers to act quickly to counteract the interference of foreign forces to act on our behalf. We are strongly against any foreign interference” (Le Républicain [Bamako], April 15). The United States will begin military maneuvers in Burkina Faso in early May, with the participation of roughly 400 troops from Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Chad, Niger, Mali and Senegal. Algeria declined an invitation to participate after expressing concerns about the U.S.-led military exercises (El Khabar, April 15). Though many of the participating nations are eager to receive U.S. arms, funds and training, none have volunteered to host AFRICOM, the new U.S. military command for Africa, which remains based in Germany.

Tackling the Ideological Basis of Extremism

Algeria has also taken steps to confront the religious and ideological foundations of AQIM and other extremist movements. The Algerian Ministry of Religious Affairs and Endowments is hosting a meeting this month of regional religious leaders and scholars to focus on grounding regional religious practice on the Maliki madhab, one of the four schools of orthodox Sunni jurisprudence. The Maliki school is widely followed in north and west Africa, and a renewed emphasis on its merits will be offered as a means of deterring the infiltration of “foreign” (i.e. Salafist) forms of Islam that espouse takfiri practices (the declaration of other Muslims as apostates deserving of death) that form the ideological foundation of terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. The conference is intended to examine “the dimensions of intellectual security, its consequences and the reasons that led to the appearance of negative ideas that had fatal consequences for many countries, including Algeria,” according to Minister of Religious Affairs Bouabdellah Ghlamallah (Magharabia, April 6).

Algeria is also seeking technological solutions to the terrorist threat. The recent introduction of sophisticated explosives detectors in the ports of Algiers, Annaba and Oran have resulted in the seizure of 50 tons of TNT as well as 300 tons of chemical fertilizer intended for use in bomb-making. Combined with new restrictions on the sale and distribution of certain chemicals and fertilizers, the inspection of cargos with the new detectors has made it difficult for terrorist groups in Algeria to obtain the necessary raw materials needed to manufacture bombs (El Khabar, April 7).

Algeria 2Assassinated DGSN Chief Ali Tounsi

A Surprising Setback for Algeria’s Security Efforts

Algeria’s counterterrorist efforts suffered an unforeseen blow in late February when Ali Tounsi, the head of Algeria’s Direction Générale de la Sureté Nationale (DGSN – Directorate General for National Security) was murdered in his office by a close friend and partner in the counterterrorism effort, Colonel Chouieb Oultache (a.k.a. “The Mustache”). Described by one source as “the architect of the modernization of the national police, the dreaded adversary of radical Islamists [and] the pet peeve of organized crime,” Ali Tounsi was a career security agent who left school in 1957 to join the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in the independence struggle against France (Jeune Afrique, March 14). He was particularly adept at undercover work, but was retired in 1988 before the government asked him to return to active service in the early 1990s to combat the growing Islamist insurgency. His assassin, Chouieb Oultache, was chief of the police air unit, a formation he was largely responsible for creating. It was reported that Oultache learned he was about to be investigated on charges of embezzlement on his way to a meeting at Tounsi’s office. No one else was present at the meeting, where the two men apparently argued before Oultache pulled his service weapon and fired three bullets into Tounsi’s head. Shaykh Ali bin Hajj, the deputy leader of the banned Front Islamique du Salut (FIS – Islamic Salvation Front), issued a statement after al-Tounsi’s murder calling for reform in the Algerian security services. The Islamist leader claims the security services of the Arab world are consistently engaged in activities forbidden by Islam and international law:

In most dictatorial regimes, only those who are involved in corruption, violations, torture, allegation of false charges against their colleagues, and those who flatter their masters are promoted to higher ranks in the security apparatus. In short, those who are good for carrying out dirty missions (Media Commission of Shaykh Ali bin-Hajj, March 10).

Ali bin-Hajj especially called for the regime to avoid appointing military men to head the nation’s security services. The two individuals considered most likely to succeed Ali Tounsi are General Sadek Ait Mesabh and Colonel Muhammad Boutouili, both of the Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS – Directorate of Research and Security) (Tout sur l’Algérie, April 12).

 

This article first appeared in the April 22, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Afghanistan’s Hizb-i-Islami Refuses to Negotiate from a Position of Weakness

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Andrew McGregor

April 22, 2010

In a statement released on April 10, Afghanistan’s Hizb-i-Islami (Party of Islam) provided an angry response to comments given to a U.S. Senate committee by Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The Defense Secretary said that negotiations would be necessary to resolve the conflict in Afghanistan, but would not work unless Kabul negotiated from a position of strength and the insurgents were convinced they were going to lose (AP, March 24; VOA, March 25). In reply to Gates’ statement, Hizb-i-Islami stated:

God willing, this dream of yours will never come true. Your dream of weakening the mujahideen will never come true. The time will never come when you get the upper hand and the mujahideen becomes weak and obliged to accept your conditions. If, God forbid, such a time comes, then our answer will be that the time for talks has passed. Be sure that we will never sit for talks with the enemy when we are weak and powerless… We would rather sacrifice ourselves in God’s path than bow down to the enemy. We will never surrender to this shame (Afghan Islamic Press, April 11).

A Hizb-i-Islami delegation was recently in Kabul to present a 15-point Mesaq-e Melli Nejat (National Rescue Plan) to the Karzai government and a number of E.U. and U.N. envoys (Pajhwok Afghan News, April 2). According to Hizb-i-Islami, their peace proposal was “logical, practical and easy.” The plan called for the complete withdrawal of occupation forces in six months, but did not call for the dissolution of the Karzai government, parliament or the security forces. The implementation of this plan has been opposed by “some arrogant and warmongering American generals” who have stressed the need for continuing the war (Afghan Islamic Press, April 11).

Gulbuddin HekmatyarHizb-i-Islami Leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

While urging the Taliban to agree to their proposal, Hizbi-Islami says it is interested only in face-to-face negotiations with other Afghans, rather than negotiating through a mediator. The movement suggests that previous negotiations with representatives of the Taliban’s Quetta Shura, conducted through the mediation of Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide led to the detention of a number of Taliban leaders.

Media reaction in Afghanistan to the Hizb-i-Islami statement was mixed. Drawing on past experience of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami movement, some suggested there was no guarantee that the group would stop killing people after reconciliation (Hasht-e Sobh [Kabul], April 10). Others said Karzai’s efforts to build ties with Hizb-i-Islami would be dangerous for Afghanistan, though one columnist suggested the American and Hizb-i-Islami positions on peace talks would inevitably become closer (Mandegar, April 10; Arman-e Melli [Kabul], April 10).

The movement’s inclination towards peace negotiations has apparently not prevented it from preparing new attacks in Kabul. Afghanistan’s National Security Directorate announced on April 10 that it had arrested 26 members of the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami on charges of carrying out terrorist operations and suicide attacks in the Afghan capital (Pajhwok Afghan News, April 10; Mandegar [Kabul], April 11).

This article first appeared in the April 22, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Lebanese Forces Leader Demands Incorporation of Hezbollah’s Weapons into Lebanese Army

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Andrew McGregor

April 22, 2010

The issue of who should control weapons belonging to the Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah continues to dominate meetings of Lebanon’s high-level National Dialogue Commission (founded in 2006). While Hezbollah insists on retaining its arms as part of Lebanon’s front-line defense against Israel, other national leaders demand the movement turn its arms over to the state for incorporation into the Lebanese Army as part of a National Defense Strategy. Most vocal of the proponents for this latter course is Samir Ja’ja (or Gea’gea), the leader of the Lebanese Forces (LF), a once formidable Maronite Christian militia that has now entered the political process.

JaJaLebanese Forces leader Samir Ja’ja (Naharnet)

Currently an ally of Sunni leader Sa’ad Hariri, Ja’ja was a prominent anti-Syrian military leader during Lebanon’s civil war in the 1970s and 80s. After Syria took effective control of Lebanon, the Maronite militia leader was imprisoned for 11 years in solitary confinement in a sub-basement of the Ministry of Defense building in Beirut. The charges and conviction remained controversial, with Ja’ja finally being released by an act of Parliament after the 2005 Cedar Revolution. Ja’ja maintains that a unified state cannot be created in Lebanon so long as arms remain outside state control, and rejects Hezbollah’s claim that Lebanon cannot defend itself unless the Shi’a movement remains armed:

It is not true that the Lebanese Army is incapable of protecting Lebanon, and Hezbollah alone is capable of this. In the army there are more and better trained special units than those possessed by Hezbollah. Why do we not allow the army to draw up the necessary plans to defend Lebanon and its south? … We consider that Hezbollah’s weapons expose Lebanon to danger more than they defend it (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 16; Now Lebanon, April 14).

This danger emanates from the threat to Lebanese sovereignty posed by Hezbollah’s independent military. Ja’ja maintains Hezbollah is part of a regional network that “starts from Tehran and does not end in Damascus” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 16). Decisions regarding confrontation with the Israeli enemy are made not by the elected officials in Beirut, but by Hezbollah in coordination with Tehran and Damascus. Hezbollah insists its weapons are “not a subject for discussion” in the National Dialogue (Daily Star [Beirut], March 8).

Ja’ja says Hezbollah is not serious about its participation in the National Dialogue as it has failed to present its own plan for a national defense strategy. The LF leader says his party would like to see the Lebanese Army develop special units similar to Hezbollah’s highly mobile guerrilla forces (Now Lebanon, April 11).

Negotiations on the arms issue have been complicated by unconfirmed Israeli and U.S. claims that Syria is supplying Hezbollah with Scud missiles, a weapon whose relative immobility, sluggish deployment and need for a large support team of technicians and vehicles makes it nearly useless in Hezbollah’s tactical planning, which relies on smaller, highly mobile missiles that can be deployed and fired in the few minutes available before an Israeli counter-strike by fighter-jets. Though Hezbollah and Syria have termed the reports a “fabrication,” Israeli jets have responded by performing aerial maneuvers over Beirut and southern Lebanon (Daily Star, April 19; Reuters, April 16). The primitive Scud missiles were used against Israel by Iraq in the 1990-91 Gulf War, but caused little damage and no direct deaths.

Druze chieftain and leader of the Democratic Gathering, veteran warlord and politician Walid Jumblatt, has called for the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons to be dropped from the national dialog after reconciling with his long-time enemies in Damascus (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 16). Ja’ja’s Maronite rival, General Michel Aoun, who has also reconciled with Damascus, threatened to quit the dialogue if details were leaked to the press. The threat led Ja’ja to suggest, “This is an invitation to talk more and more about the issue of arms” (Ya Libnan, April 15). The new positions adopted by Jumblatt and Aoun forced President Michel Sulayman to adjourn the national dialogue until June 3.

A related topic being discussed in the national dialogue is the issue of arms held by Palestinians in Lebanese refugee camps. After a number of recent clashes within the camps, Syria has offered to assist in the resolution of this matter (al-Liwaa, April 9). As Ja’ja pointed out in a recent interview, Syrian intelligence agencies are highly influential within the camps (Now Lebanon, April 9).

This article first appeared in the April 22, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor

Abdullah Azzam Brigades Commander Promises Further Strikes on Israel

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Andrew McGregor

April 17, 2010

A communiqué from Salih bin Abdallah al-Qar’awi, a field commander in the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, was issued earlier this month. The commander discussed Lebanese issues in detail while promising further strikes on Israel (al-Fajr Media Center, April 4).

al-QarawiSalih Bin-Abdallah al-Qar’awi

A native of Saudi Arabia, al-Qar’awi appears on the Kingdom’s list of the 85 most wanted terrorist suspects. In 2004, al-Qar’awi went to Iraq to join the mujahideen. After fighting in the battle for Fallujah, al-Qar’awi became very close to the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who gave him various tasks in Syria and Lebanon. Eventually he was captured by members of the Nusayri sect in Syria and turned over to Saudi authorities who imprisoned him for eight months. Al-Qar’awi was released when authorities could not prove he had fought in Iraq.

Al-Qar’awi went on to form the Abdullah Azzam Brigades (named for the Palestinian jihad ideologue Abdullah Azzam – 1941-1989), which were divided into various units, including the Ziyad al-Jarrah squad (named for the Lebanese 9/11 hijacker) which “specializes” in attacks on Israel. This group’s first rocket attack on Israel took place a year and a half ago. Following Hezbollah’s denouncement of the group’s activities, al-Qar’awi has accused the Shi’a movement of cooperating with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to protect Israel from attack. The jihadi commander claims the aim of the Ziyad al-Jarrah formation is to expel the Jews from Palestine and unite the Muslims of the “ring states” (Syria, Jordan and Egypt) in this effort. The movement also opposes an American presence in the Middle East, which has led to “colonization and Westernization.”

Within Lebanon, al-Qar’awi denies having played any role in the wave of political assassinations afflicting that nation, for which he blames Hezbollah and Syria, with the support of Lebanon’s military.  Al-Qar’awi insists the Lebanese Army has come under the influence of the Shiite Hezbollah and Amal movements, leading to arbitrary measures against the Sunni community that include torture, detention and murder.

Al-Qar’awi acknowledges that his group’s largely ineffective rocket attacks often miss their targets and are sometimes detected and disabled. Nevertheless, such attacks serve the larger strategic objective of disrupting Israel’s efforts to establish security. “It is true that we did not hit vital targets, but the most important thing is to keep attacking them [Israel]. This undermines their security and economy. Moreover, the attacks affect their political plans, including the Judaization of Jerusalem and the psychological normalization with the Muslim peoples.” Though al-Qar’awi accuses Hezbollah of protecting Israel (despite Hezbollah’s strong resistance to Israeli forces in the 2006 invasion of Lebanon), his own group has made only a few attempts to fire rockets across the border.

In October 2009, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades tried to fire five Katyusha rockets at the Israeli city of Kiryat Shmona. One rocket fired prematurely, which forced the team to abandon the mission and flee the area (Israeli fighter-jet response time to rocket launches along the Lebanese border is roughly ten minutes) (al-Fajr, October 29, 2009). Videos of Azzam Brigade launches against Israel have appeared on jihadi websites (al-Fajr, July 23, 2009).

There are many odd aspects to al-Qar’awi’s message that are inconsistent with al-Qaeda communiqués, for example the mention of Israel by name, the reference to Rafik Hariri as Lebanon’s Prime Minister (al-Qaeda does not recognize “apostate” regimes), the extensive discussion of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (which has never been an issue for al-Qaeda), etc. (al-Nahar, April 7).  Syrian Salafist leader Shaykh Omar Bakri questioned the authenticity of the message, saying, “I doubt that Qar’awi is still alive; the wording used in this message was not the work of a Salafist jihadi but of someone who is familiar with the intelligence world and has a vested interest in Lebanese politics” (Now Lebanon, April 9).  A Lebanese security source suggested the message was part of an attempt to foment conflict between Sunnis and Shi’a in Lebanon, possibly as a substitute for “Israeli aggression” or as preparation for it (As-Safir, April 8). It was noted elsewhere that the bulk of the message seemed to focus on an “enemy” other than Israel. “The hostility shown toward the government, the Lebanese Army, and the Shiite sect—with Hezbollah and the Amal Movement as representatives—clearly reveals the forces that will be identified as enemies and targeted” (al-Akhbar, April 6).

This article first appeared in the April 17, 2010 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor