Category Archives: Pakistan

Pakistani Taliban Threaten Israel and Pashtun Nationalists with Suicide Bombers

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Andrew McGregor

January 28, 2009

Well-pleased with the local “success” of their suicide bombing campaign, the leaders of Pakistan’s Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are now threatening to send their suicide bombers against Israeli targets and Pakistan’s Pashtun politicians.

AsfanyarANP Leader Asfandyar Wali Khan

In a telephone interview, TTP leader Baitullah Mahsud expressed his anger at Israel’s devastating incursion into Gaza, promising to avenge the Palestinian Muslims for Israel’s “atrocities” (BBC Urdu, January 18). Saying he would teach Israel an “historic lesson,” Baitullah declared his suicide bombers could strike anywhere in the worlds with God’s help (Daily Times [Lahore], January 18).

Baitullah’s right-hand man, Hakimullah Mahsud, followed up several days later by threatening to send TTP suicide bombers against leaders of the Pashtun-based Awami National Party (ANP) in response to the government’s offensive in the turbulent Swat region: “We have prepared a hit-list of ANP leaders and activists who will be the target of suicide attacks and gunfire. People must avoid meeting ANP leaders and attending their functions” (The News [Islamabad], January 22; Pak Tribune, January 24). Hakimullah, the regional TTP commander for the Khyber, Kurram, and Orakzai tribal agencies, has issued similar threats against the ANP before (The News, November 27, 2008).

Led by Asfandyar Wali Khan, the ANP is a secular/left national political party with a stronghold in the Pashtun-dominated North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. The ANP was a big winner in last year’s elections, forming the largest party in the NWFP’s ruling coalition and playing a supporting role in the central government coalition in Islamabad (Pakistan Times, February 25, 2008; The Nation [Islamabad], January 9).

Under Asfandyar Wali Khan, the ANP has been a strong opponent of the Taliban, encouraging dialogue with moderate Islamist elements while rejecting Taliban violence. As a result, the movement has been a frequent target of the Taliban, which no doubt feels threatened by the ANP’s electoral success. Press reports of Asfandyar Wali Khan visiting U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters in Tampa Bay in 2006 and 2008 have not endeared the Awami Party leader to the Taliban (Dawn [Karachi], May 9, 2008). The militants demand that the ANP immediately implement Shari’a (Islamic law) in the NWFP, release all Taliban prisoners, and pay compensation for losses suffered during government offensives in Swat and elsewhere in the frontier region (Pak Tribune, January 24).

This article first appeared in the January 28, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Taliban Target Karachi and Peshawar Links in NATO’s Afghanistan Supply-Chain

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Andrew McGregor

January 21, 2009

The announcement yesterday by General David Petraeus that the United States had reached agreements with Russia and several Central Asian nations for a new (and costly) U.S.-NATO supply route into Afghanistan came as the struggle for control of the supply routes through Pakistan continues. While Pakistan’s military battles the Taliban to secure the Khyber Pass, a vital route for carrying U.S. and NATO supplies into Afghanistan, there are signs that the Taliban is not only continuing attacks on supply terminals in the North-West Frontier Province city of Peshawar, but now intends to choke off Coalition supplies at their offloading point in the harbor of Karachi. Roughly 75% of Coalition supplies run through Karachi to the Khyber Pass and on into Afghanistan, usually carried by private Pakistani transport contractors.

Khyber supply chain 1NATO’s Fuel Supplies are Frequently Targeted

Following months of reports concerning the infiltration of Taliban militants in the port city of Karachi, Pakistani security forces encountered stiff resistance during a series of raids on Taliban safe-houses in the Sohrab Goth neighborhood of Karachi on January 15 (Dawn [Karachi], January 15). Two security men were killed and seven wounded as 79 suspects and a large number of modern weapons were seized. The militants were alleged to have been warning transportation firms not to take on loads destined for Coalition forces in Afghanistan. The suspects allegedly included members of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the banned Lashkar-e-Jhagvi. An Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) team and a detachment of the Anti-Violent Crime Unit (ACVU) participated in the raids as part of their search for a kidnapped Iranian commercial attaché. Over 100 mobile units of the police and the Sindh Rangers, a Karachi-based Interior Ministry paramilitary, also participated in the raids (Daily Times [Lahore], January 16). According to Karachi police chief Wasim Ahmed, the suspects were “planning massive terrorist activities in the city” (Press Trust of India, January 16). Residents of the neighborhood described the suspects as innocent men who worked as mechanics and laborers (Daily Times, January 16).

Khyber Supply chain 2 MapTTP spokesman Maulvi Omar boasted of the Taliban presence in Karachi last summer:

We are very strong in Karachi; our network could come in action once the central Amir of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan [Baitullah Mahsud] ordered the Taliban for action. We want to help improve law and order and maintain peace in Karachi. The Taliban could surface in Karachi if foreign hands do not stop interfering in the city… We are capable of capturing any city of the country at any given time (Pakistan Press International, August 6, 2008; Daily Times, August 10, 2008).

At the other end of the supply route in the north-west frontier region, NATO supply terminals were left largely unguarded earlier this month when Frontier Corps paramilitary troops were withdrawn from the ring road where the terminals are located for duty in Peshawar. Taliban militants took advantage of the lack of security to fire six rockets into the Faisal and Khyber Ittifaq terminals in Peshawar, destroying a total of six containers. The attackers fled without known casualties after a short fire-fight with the remaining security personnel (Daily Times, January 13). The attacks were the first in Peshawar since a series of strikes in December killed three people and destroyed massive quantities of military equipment awaiting shipment through the Khyber Pass. The supply terminals consist largely of open fields and have no special defenses.

Khyber supply chain 3Vulnerable NATO Supply Terminal

After the attack, Peshawar police began joint patrols with troopers from the Frontier Corps paramilitary, including checks on pedestrians and passing vehicles (Geo TV, January 14). A new security plan has been devised for protecting the 14 terminals on the Peshawar ring road. Over the next few weeks the United States is scheduled to supply Pakistan’s Frontier Police with large quantities of non-lethal security and transportation equipment (The News [Islamabad], January 15). There are continuing reports that locally contracted owners of oil tankers are heeding the warnings from the Taliban while meeting their own needs by setting fire to their trucks to collect insurance provided by foreign companies (Daily Afghanistan, December 14, 2008). Other companies hauling supplies along the 30-mile highway between Peshawar and Torkham are beginning to decline loads, citing the risk to their drivers (AFP, December 31, 2008).

The supply route through the Khyber Pass was shut down on January 13 as Pakistani military forces expanded a two-week-old offensive against Taliban militants in the Landi Kotal and Jamrud subdivisions of the Khyber Tribal Agency. With the border post at Torkham closed, as well as the entire highway between Torkham and Peshawar, Pakistani troops searched for Taliban hideouts and demolished homes believed to shelter Taliban fighters (AFP, January 13). It was the second time this month the Peshawar-Torkham highway has been closed for security purposes.

A secondary supply route through southwest Pakistan 375 miles south of the Khyber Pass has only just been reopened after tribesmen built road-blocks to protest the killing of a local man in a drug raid. The route runs from Quetta (believed to be the home of the Afghan Taliban’s top leadership) to the border point at Spin Boldak. The blockade in the town of Qila Abdullah left hundreds of trucks stranded along the road for five days until government officials negotiated a removal of the blockade. The road was immediately closed again due to snow (AFP, January 14).

 

This article first appeared in the January 21, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

New Chief of Pakistan’s ISI Defends Taliban’s Right to Jihad

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Andrew McGregor

January 21, 2009

In a recent interview with Germany’s Der Spiegel, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Director-General, Lieutenant-General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, gave a rather startling reply when asked about the reluctance of Pakistan’s military to apprehend senior Taliban leaders based in Quetta and elsewhere in Pakistan: “Shouldn’t they be allowed to think and say what they please? They believe that jihad is their obligation. Isn’t that freedom of opinion?” (Der Spiegel, January 6).

Ahmad ShujaLieutenant-General Ahmad Shuja Pasha (Express Tribune)

The remark was undoubtedly of concern to U.S. counter-terrorism officials, who view the ISI with deep suspicion and have had only limited success in encouraging Pakistan’s military to engage Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Pakistan’s north-west frontier region. General Pasha directed military operations in that region from 2005 until his appointment as ISI commander on September 29, 2008.

Pakistan’s military later downplayed the ISI chief’s remarks through the armed forces’ Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), which claimed that “important issues have been reported out of context or have been incorrectly constructed as a result of mistranslation… Some of the things reported are either incongruous or have not been clearly stated.” ISPR added that the general’s “views on the handling of al-Qaeda and other terrorists have been incorrectly reported” (NDTV [New Delhi], January 7; Daily Times [Lahore], January 10). ISPR claims of mistranslation may be a reach – Der Spiegel noted that the interview was conducted in English and in the General’s “surprisingly accent-free German,” learned while taking officer training in Germany during the 1980s.

The leader of the opposition in Pakistan’s National Assembly, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan (leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (N)), said the ISI chief should not be giving media interviews and described his remarks as “out of place” (Daily Times, January 13).

General Pasha denied that he and Armed Forces commander Ashfaq Pervez Kayani discussed U.S. drone attacks on Taliban and al-Qaeda suspects on Pakistani territory during a meeting with U.S. officials held on the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier last August: “We never discussed that, nor did we agree to it… But to be honest, what can we do against the drone attacks? Should we fight the Americans or attack an Afghan post, because that’s where the drones are coming from? Can we win this? Does it benefit Pakistan?”

In another recent Spiegel interview, the head of Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS – domestic intelligence), Amrullah Saleh, noted, “When the Americans offered to fight the [Taliban/al-Qaeda] fighters themselves, the Pakistanis rejected them, saying you can’t go in, we are a sovereign state. The true reason behind this is that Islamabad is providing the militant groups with ammunition and training” (Der Spiegel, December 8, 2008).

The ISI director also stated that he reports “regularly to the president [Asif Ali Zardari] and take orders from him.” The problem is that ISI is supposed to report to the Prime Minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani (Dawn [Karachi], July 27, 2008; BBC, July 28, 2008). Prime Minister Gilani was forced to drop plans to transfer control of the ISI to the Interior Ministry last summer after objections from Armed Forces commander Ashfaq Pervez Kayani and the General Staff (The Nation [Islamabad], July 27, 2008; Times of India, August 6, 2008; BBC, July 28, 2008). Pasha was appointed head of the ISI by General Kayani last September, despite efforts by the Prime Minister to assume control of the appointment process.

During the Spiegel interview, Lt.-Gen. Pasha suggested a war with India over the Mumbai incident was unlikely: “We may be crazy in Pakistan, but not completely out of our minds. We know full well that terror is our enemy, not India.”

This article first appeared in the January 21, 2009 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Pakistan’s “Anti-Terrorist” Taliban Vow to Fight India if Necessary

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Andrew McGregor

December 12, 2008

Recent statements from Pakistani Taliban leaders suggest an Indian attack on Pakistan in response to alleged Pakistani responsibility for the Mumbai terrorist assault could do what the Pakistani military and politicians have been unable to do so far – bring the Pashtun militants of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) onside with the Pakistani government in a common cause.

Qari Saifullah AkhtarQari Saifullah Akhtar

Taliban spokesman Qari Saifullah Akhtar announced the Taliban was ready to “annihilate” the 8,500 Indian troops it claims are operating in Afghanistan. Akhtar pledged the Taliban would stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the Pakistani army if India “committed aggression” against Pakistan; “We’ll put all the differences aside at this juncture and unite… We’ll stand by the army against external powers… The Taliban are like lions before whom all the powerful have to bow down.” The Taliban spokesman added that Indians rather than the Taliban were responsible for the Mumbai attacks. According to Akhtar, the Taliban condemn the killing of innocent civilians and are “opposed to terrorism across the world” (Nawa-i-Waqt [Rawalpindi], December 3).

Though India is not part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Pakistan has recently complained about an un-mandated Indian military presence in Afghanistan (ANI, November 25). In 2006, India announced it would send 3,000 members of the paramilitary Indo-Tibetan Border Police to Afghanistan to guard Indians working on a new road between Kandahar and the Iranian port of Chabahar (Daily Times [Karachi], February 8, 2006). Great Britain has asked India in the past to commit troops to the ISAF mission (The Tribune [Chandigarh], May 2, 2006).

Maulvi Omar, another Taliban spokesman, was also quoted as saying the Taliban would defend the Line of Control (the unofficial military border between Indian and Pakistani Kashmir) in the same way they defend the Durand Line (the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan). Since the Taliban basically ignore the Durand Line, the meaning of Omar’s statement is somewhat elusive. Maulvi Omar added, “in the event of an Indian attack, we’ll make it clear to the Pakistani people whether we are defenders of this country or militants” (Nawa-i-Waqt [Rawalpindi], December 3).

The Taliban’s newfound nationalism and opposition to terrorist attacks will come as a revelation to many. Pakistan’s regular forces are unlikely to accept Taliban assistance in any but the most extreme circumstances, though the option may be preferable to leaving the NWFP in Taliban hands in order to move Pakistani military assets currently deployed there up to the border with India. A major military withdrawal from the NWFP and tribal agencies would effectively leave Taliban and al-Qaeda elements free to operate in the area just as Pakistani forces have taken the initiative in a large regional offensive. It would also disturb the United States, which is encouraging Pakistan to intensify its campaign against the militants. The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, was in Pakistan earlier this month to urge Pakistan to take “more concerted action against militant extremists elsewhere in the country,” according to a U.S. embassy statement (Reuters, December 3).

 

This article first appeared in the December 12, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Mystery Surrounds Professional Assassination of Special Forces General in Islamabad

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Andrew McGregor

November 26, 2008

Though no claim of responsibility has been made, it appears Taliban/al-Qaeda elements may be behind the assassination of a recently retired Pakistani Special Forces general and his driver in Islamabad (The News [Islamabad], November 20). The target of what appeared to be the work of professional killers was Major General (Ret.) Amir Faisal Alvi, former General Officer Commanding of the Special Services Group (SSG), Pakistan’s elite Special Forces unit.

AlviMajor General (Ret.) Amir Faisal Alvi

General Alvi led several SSG operations in the Wana district of South Waziristan, during which numerous Taliban members were killed or captured. Seemingly at the top of his career, General Alvi was suddenly dismissed by the Army on disciplinary grounds for “conduct unbecoming” in August, 2005. The details of the dismissal have never been made public, leaving outsiders to speculate whether the dismissal may be linked to his assassination.

After a forcible retirement from the Army, General Alvi took up an executive position with the Islamabad office of Malaysia’s Red Tone Communications, a telecommunications company. An associate of the general revealed afterwards that the general had been receiving phone-threats from the Taliban for three months and had a death threat painted on his house only days before the murder (The News, November 20). Despite the warnings, General Alvi appears to have taken few, if any security precautions, taking the same route to his office most days. The ambush was carefully planned, taking place at a speed-break where his vehicle would be forced to slow down.

According to witnesses, General Alvi’s vehicle was intercepted at the speed-break by two youths on a motorcycle and a Mitsubishi Pajero SUV. Acting in a deliberate fashion, the assailants, one youth from the motorcycle and two men from the SUV, opened fire from both sides of the general’s vehicle, making sure that Alvi was dead before leaving. The whole operation took roughly 30 seconds. According to police, 9-mm pistols were used in the attack, with the general struck by bullets eight times, his driver six times (The News, November 20).

A former instructor of the General at the military academy, Brigadier Shaukat Qadir speculated on the reason Alvi may have been targeted: “he was the kind of fellow who probably made some boasts about what he has done in his life in the SSG and elsewhere in the operations in Wana so perhaps that would be one reason I could think of” (Dawn [Karachi], November 19). Though the SSG played a major role in the Lal Masjid assault of 2007, General Alvi was no longer with the force by that time. 20 SSG members were killed in a retaliatory suicide bombing on the SSG officers’ mess in September 2007.

Besides al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the Sunni extremist Lashkar-i-Jhangvi is also considered a suspect in the killings. Interior Affairs Advisor Rehman Malik announced recently that Lashkar-i-Jhangvi was one of three groups being used to carry out al-Qaeda operations in Pakistan (The News, November 23; Dawn, November 21). Considering the sensitive nature of General Alvi’s work with the SSG and the mystery surrounding his dismissal from the army, it is also possible that the reason for his death may be known only to those deep inside Pakistan’s intelligence community.

The SSG consists of at least three battalions of highly trained commandos. Since its formation in 1956, SSG personnel have received advanced training from the Special Forces of Britain, the United States and China. The SSG in turn offers Special Forces training to a number of Middle East nations. The unit saw extensive service during the 1965 and 1971 wars with India and the 1978-1979 Soviet-Afghan war. Unconventional warfare, reconnaissance, counter-terrorism and intelligence-gathering are a few of its many responsibilities. In recent years the SSG has been used in covert operations targeting al-Qaeda and Taliban members in Pakistan’s northwest frontier region. SSG personnel often work closely with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence.

This article first appeared in the November 26, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Pakistani Islamist Fatwa Refutes Taliban’s Jihad

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Andrew McGregor

October 22, 2008

In a surprising move, a group of Pakistani clerics best known for their hardline views on Islam’s role in society have gathered to issue a fatwa condemning suicide-bombing and the current trend of individuals or organizations declaring jihad against the state at any moment they feel appropriate. Brought together under the umbrella of the Mutahidda Ulema Council (MUC), the conference agreed “only the state has the authority to call for jihad, and individuals or groups are not authorized to do that” (Daily Times [Lahore], October 16).

NaeemiConference Host Maulana Sarfaraz Naeemi

The meeting brought together an unlikely assemblage of Pakistani religious leaders. The council included representatives from the Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat (a Barelvi Sunni movement largely based on the non-Pashtun population of the Punjab) and their ideological opponents in the conservative Deobandi Jamaat Ulema-e Islam. The Shi’a Ahl-e Tashee was present, as was the Sipah-e Sahaba, a banned radical Sunni organization involved in terrorist violence against Shi’a. Representatives from minority Sunni groups like the Ahl-e Hadith and Jamaat-e Islami were also present. The conference was hosted in Lahore by the Jamia Naeemia (led by Maulana Sarfaraz Naeemi), a group known for its harsh criticism of perceived government failures to implement strict applications of Islam in the social and political spheres of Pakistan.

Conference delegates were unanimous in their rejection of suicide-bombing as haram (forbidden) and najaaiz (illegitimate), though the statement added: “It seems as if the government is covertly backing these attacks so that patriotic citizens may not assemble and launch a mass drive for the defense of the country” (The News [Islamabad], October 14). While moderate Islamic leaders like Mufti Munibur Rehman have issued fatwas against suicide-bombing in the past, few members of the MUC group of clerics have any affiliation to “moderate” trends of Islamic interpretation (Daily Times, October 16). Despite the criticism of the government, the clerics’ condemnation of suicide bombing was welcomed by Pakistan’s Interior advisor, Rehman Malik.

The conference also issued a number of demands on the Islamabad government, including an immediate stop to military operations in the Bajaur and Swat frontier districts, an alliance between Pakistan and Iran, and the public revelation of any secret deals made between ex-President Pervez Musharraf and the United States. The clerics condemned the recent U.S. nuclear trade deal with India as dangerous to Pakistan, which has just completed its own deal for Chinese nuclear assistance (Press Trust of India, October 2; Daily Times, October 16; October 19).

Tribal lashkar-s (ad-hoc military formations) have been formed in the frontier region in recent weeks to combat Taliban militants, but since the MUC meeting the Taliban have struck back with deadly suicide attacks against tribal jirga-s (assemblies) convened to discuss eliminating the militants (Geo TV, October 18; KUNA, October 19). The attacks suggest that even a fatwa issued by hardline Islamists is now insufficient to slow the rapid escalation of violence in the tribal regions.

 This article first appeared in the October 22, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Pakistan’s Taliban Threaten Suicide Attacks if Military Offensive in Swat Is Not Halted

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Andrew McGregor

August 12, 2008

Despite the existence of a two-month-old peace agreement between Pakistan’s government and tribal militants in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), heavy fighting in the NWFP’s Swat valley region is now in its second week. More than 200,000 people have been displaced by fighting with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Dawn [Karachi], August 10). The failed peace agreement called for a withdrawal of government security forces from the NWFP and the implementation of Shari’a law. As part of the growing tensions between Pakistan and India, Pakistan’s security agencies now claim that the majority of the weapons used by the militants are made in India (The Nation [Islamabad], August 6).

Pak Military in SwatPakistani Troops Deploy in Swat (A. Majeed/AFP)

Local militants have focused on the destruction of health clinics, girls’ schools, and bridges with planted explosives. As many as 70 schools have been destroyed, leaving 17,000 students without educational facilities. Teachers have been assassinated and several people beheaded, including a Shiite bank employee (Associated Press of Pakistan, August 10; BBC, August 6). Even tourist resorts, a backbone of the local economy in the scenic Swat valley, have been destroyed.

Pakistan’s military, while coming under criticism for the growing number of civilian casualties, also appears to be conducting a “hearts and minds” operation, providing residents of Swat with medicine and food free of cost, freeing prisoners, and compensating property owners for the destruction of their buildings (Associated Press of Pakistan, August 4; The News [Islamabad], August 5). Local jirgas (assemblies of elders) have appealed to both the Taliban and government forces to cease combat in populated areas (Nawa-e Waqt [Rawalpindi], August 6).

Eight policemen were killed when several busloads of militants attacked a police station in Swat’s Buner District. TTP spokesman Muslim Khan stated “We will continue targeting all those police officials who are taking part in the ongoing military operation against us” (Daily Times [Lahore] August 10; Dawn, August 10).

Taliban commander Ali Bakht, a close aide to regional Taliban leader Maulana Fazlullah, was killed together with 13 other militants on August 6 during a five-hour battle after Pakistan’s military blew up his house (Dawn, August 7; Daily Times, August 6). Ali Bakht was one of the chief negotiators of the peace deal reached with the NWFP’s ruling Awami National Party (ANP) and is one of a number of Taliban commanders to be killed as artillery fire and helicopter gunships pound Taliban positions.

Though the Taliban insist their casualties in Swat are slight, threats to initiate a wave of suicide bombings across Pakistan’s major cities unless the military offensive is called off suggest the Taliban is feeling pressure. TTP spokesman Maulvi Omar claims a squad of suicide bombers aged 15 to 20, including young women, has been assembled for this purpose: “A large number of women have been approaching us for the past few years and consistently wishing to be given an opportunity to sacrifice their lives for a noble cause” (The News, August 6).

There are indications both the provincial government and the Taliban tried to head off the offensive by offering to enter into negotiations, but Pakistan’s military leadership was fed up with repeated violations of the existing agreement, in particular the murder of three military intelligence agents and the kidnapping of 30 members of the paramilitary Frontier Corps (The News, August 5). The Army has now decided driving the Taliban militants from the Swat valley is the only solution (Daily Times [Lahore], August 5).

Fighting has also erupted in numerous other parts of the NWFP and the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA), including the Bajaur Agency, where security forces claim over 100 militants have been killed in the last four days (Frontier Post [Peshawar], August 11).

 

This article first appeared in the August 12, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Pakistan’s Frontier Corps Abandon Colonial-Era Fort to Taliban

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Andrew McGregor

August 6, 2008

Pakistan’s paramilitary Frontier Corps is pulling out of fortified positions in the Taliban hotbed of South Waziristan, including a 1930s-era colonial fort at Ladha that was the center of heavy fighting last January, when it came under attack by 250 to 300 insurgents in the largest of a series of recent assaults by tribesmen on the stronghold (Pakistan Times, January 12). 20 to 30 militants carrying rockets and small arms were killed in that attack, which was repulsed only through the use of artillery and mortars (PakTribune, January 19). Tribesmen have also made a habit of abducting soldiers stationed at the fort. Rumors are now circulating in the region that the pullback is only a preliminary step in a large-scale offensive by NATO or Pakistan government forces (The News [Islamabad], August 1). The Ladha garrison of several hundred soldiers appears to be relocating to the town of Razmak in Northern Waziristan. Smaller posts in the Saam region of South Waziristan were also being abandoned. Many of these posts were located in areas belonging to the Mahsud tribe, from which local Taliban leader Baitullah Mahsud hails.

Ladha FortFrontier Corps spokesmen cited difficulties in supplying Ladha Fort and a decision to transform the building into a hospital as reasons for pulling out the garrison. The latter reason has left some locals perplexed – a hospital was recently built only ten kilometers away but has never been fitted out with medical equipment or supplies. One elder told journalists that elders from several sections of the Mahsud tribe had been urged by government officials to demand a hospital in Ladha (The News, August 1). Th Frontier Corps Inspector General, Major General Muhammad Alam Khattak, noted that the fort had lost its strategic importance after local people erected housing outside its walls, pointing out that “a tribal jirga (assembly)” had requested the fort be turned into a hospital (Daily Times, August 1). Addressing speculation that the fort was being turned over to the Taliban as part of a negotiated peace settlement with the new government in Islamabad, General Khattak would only say; “The fighting phase is over in this area, and now negotiations are being held with the people” (Gulf News, July 31).

In an optimistic vein, General Khattak suggested it would not matter if the Taliban seized the fort after it was turned into a medical facility, as local tribesmen would then rise up to expel the Taliban (HI Pakistan, July 28). A spokesman for the Tehrik-i-Taliban of Pakistan declared; “We will definitely capture all those posts vacated by the FC in Ladha and Saam” (The News, August 1).

This article first appeared in the August 6, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Balochistan Rebel Leader Seeks Outside Military Support

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Andrew McGregor

July 29, 2008

While global attention remains focused on Taliban activities in Pakistan’s northwest frontier, heavy fighting has broken out in southwest Pakistan’s Balochistan province, where well-armed nationalist insurgents are battling detachments of the locally-raised Frontier Corps. While sparsely populated, Pakistan’s biggest province is rich in minerals and energy resources, inspiring a number of rebel movements to fight what they view as uncompensated exploitation of the region by Pakistan’s central government.

NawabNawab Sardar Brahamdagh Khan Bugti (al-Jazeera)

Nawab Sardar Brahamdagh Khan Bugti, current leader of the Baloch Republican Party and grandson of the late Balochi nationalist leader Nawab Akbar Bugti (killed by Pakistani security forces in 2006), has announced that rebel forces under his command are prepared to accept military assistance from any nation willing to provide it, including India, Iran or Afghanistan (BBC, July 22). In an interview from an undisclosed location, Brahamdagh Bugti argued: “Pakistan is a nuclear power, and if it can use the assistance and sophisticated weapons it is getting from the United States against the Baloch people, we have the right to accept external assistance… No country has so far provided assistance to us. However, if any country, including India, Afghanistan, and Iran, offers assistance or cooperation, we will happily accept it.”

In the current fighting centered around Dera Bugti, insurgents belonging to the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Republican Army (BRA) have blasted gas pipelines, brought down power pylons, attacked a gas plant with rockets, destroyed military vehicles with remote-controlled bombs and used explosives to heavily damage the wall of a Frontier Corps fort. Helicopters have been brought in to assist the Frontier Corps, which has been accused by the insurgents of killing civilians in rebel-held areas (Daily Times [Lahore], July 21; Dawn [Karachi], July 20, July 21; Balochwarna.com, July 24). A general strike organized by a number of Baloch nationalist groups was observed throughout much of Balochistan on July 25 in protest of the killings of women and children in government counter-attacks (Balochwarna.com, July 26). Government forces report destroying insurgent bases and seizing large caches of weapons at several hidden depots (Daily Times, July 22).

The fighting follows the release of a number of imprisoned Balochi nationalists and a partial pullback of government forces from selected regions of Balochistan—not including Dera Bugti—by the new government in Islamabad. The Dera Bugti region is home to Pakistan’s largest natural gas fields and large parts of its gas distribution grid (see Terrorism Monitor, April 3). According to Bramadagh Bugti: “The [current] operation is being conducted to plunder the resources and to keep the Baloch nation backward. The rulers are destroying the Baloch nation for this purpose. We are fighting to defend our land and ourselves. There will be resistance if someone comes here to plunder our resources on the pretext of development” (BBC, July 22).

 This article first appeared in the July 29, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus

Afghanistan and Pakistan Agree to Implement Biometric Security on Border

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Andrew McGregor

June 18, 2008

The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan have agreed to adopt a high-tech method to address the ongoing problem of suspects wanted for terrorism and other crimes crossing their mutual border. At a June 8 meeting between President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan and the advisor to Pakistan’s prime minister on internal affairs and narcotics control, Rehman Malik, an agreement was reached to resume a once-aborted program to install biometric identification equipment at border points (The News International [Karachi], June 9).

The biometrics program was to begin in February 2007, but was halted when Afghanistan ceased cooperating. Biometric scanning equipment will be placed at first at three points along the common border (PakTribune, June 9). Technical teams will be assigned to install the system in the interests of improving security along the border (Bakhtar News Agency, June 9).

Biometric identification covers a wide range of techniques and systems, including fingerprinting, facial recognition scans and retinal scans. The joint announcement did not specify which systems will be put in place along the Afghan/Pakistani border.

The announcement came only days after President George W. Bush issued a presidential directive authorizing the “application of biometric technologies” which will “improve the executive branch’s ability to identify and screen for persons who may pose a national security threat.” The directive is aimed at “known and suspected terrorists” and authorizes federal agencies to “use mutually compatible methods and procedures in the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information of individuals in a lawful and appropriate manner” (NSPD 59/HSPD 24, June 5). One of the main problems in biometric recognition is the widespread use of incompatible systems, even within the U.S. federal government, thus hampering the sharing of data.

The use of biometrics is not new in Afghanistan; U.S. Marines have been using fingerprinting, iris scans and electronic databases to vet recruits to the Afghan National Police, though even here not all military databases are compatible (Wired, May 22). There are other unresolved problems with the technology, including the irreversibility of security breaches. Cambridge security engineering professor Ross Anderson warned of these dangers in a recent report to the UK House of Commons: “There is a fundamental security engineering problem with biometrics as opposed to the cryptographic keys in your chip and pin card. Once your biometrics become compromised, you cannot revoke them. It is not practical to do eye or finger transplants” (Daily Mail, June 7).

This article first appeared in the June 18, 2008 issue of the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus